ANWR: The Legislative Quagmire Surrounding Stakeholder Control and Protection, and the Practical Consequences of Allowing Exploration by Pasquale, Kristofer
Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 
Volume 9 Number 2 Article 3 
4-1-2002 
ANWR: The Legislative Quagmire Surrounding Stakeholder 
Control and Protection, and the Practical Consequences of 
Allowing Exploration 
Kristofer Pasquale 
University of Idaho College of Law (Student) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj 
 Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kristofer Pasquale, ANWR: The Legislative Quagmire Surrounding Stakeholder Control and Protection, and 
the Practical Consequences of Allowing Exploration, 9 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 245 (2002). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj/vol9/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Environmental Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
ANWR: THE LEGISLATIVE QUAGMIRE SURROUNDING
STAKEHOLDER CONTROL AND PROTECTION, AND THE
PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING EXPLORATION
Kristofer Pasquale*
Introduction
Along the freezing northern region of Alaska's coast lies
approximately twenty million acres of land known as the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge, or better known by its acronym, ANWR.
For the last thirty years, battles have raged between the state and the
federal government, between environmentalists and oil companies,
and between a variety of other stakeholders for control over the future
of development of ANWR for oil exploration and production.' The
ongoing, contentious debate on whether to explore and drill for oil in
ANWR is at the forefront of national policy, concerning environ-
mentalists and peaking oil industry interest still today.2
This comment explores the legislative history behind what has
become ANWR, identifies possible stakeholders in the question of
how ANWR should be treated, and analyzes the effect that
exploration would have upon them. This comment also details the
critical issues surrounding supply, economics, and the impact
regarding the decision about whether to allow leasing and drilling in
ANWR, particularly the Coastal Plain or the "1002 Area." Part I
examines the legislative history surrounding the formation of ANWR
and the legislation stemming from its creation. Part II considers the
Native interests in ANWR from opposing perspectives; the Inupiat
Kristofer Pasquale is a third-year law student who will graduate from the
University of Idaho College of Law in 2003. He spent 18 years living in Alaska,
where he experienced firsthand the natural splendor of that State. Feeling that it
was only right to give something back to the "Great Land", Mr. Pasquale
endeavored to write on this topic to provide potential researchers insight into the
many interests that surround the complex issue of exploring for oil in ANWR.
I How Much Would It Really Help? Alaska's Oil: Caribou v. Oil,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2001.
2 Id.
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Natives representing economic interests, and the Gwich'in Indians
representing cultural and subsistence interests. Part III discusses
Alaska's great economic interest in controlling the future of ANWR
and the State's battle with the federal government for control of
ANWR. Part IV briefly looks to the United States' responsibility in
honoring international treaties regarding potential impacts on
migratory species if drilling is allowed. Part V explores the heart of
the environmentalists' concern regarding allowing development in
ANWR, analyzing the impact development would have upon
ANWR's pristine ecosystems and its wildlife. Part VI considers the
national interests surrounding ANWR, analyzing the truths behind the
actual amount of recoverable oil and looking at proponents'
arguments for drilling. Part VII looks at the new developments in
potential legislation during the 107" Congress and the steps it has
taken thus far. Finally, this note ends by suggesting the best possible
resolution based on current understanding of this issue.
Part I: Legislative History
Creation of the National Wildlife Refuge System
The National Wildlife Refuge System was unofficially created
by President Theodore Roosevelt when he established the first Refuge
in 1903- the Pelican Island Reserve in Florida.3 The original purpose
of Pelican Island Reserve was to protect Florida's dwindling bird
population from further depletion, but this reserve would have
significant impacts upon future legislation in the area of
environmental protection, setting a standard for federal government
interest in protecting the environment.4
The official National Wildlife Refuge System stemmed from
Roosevelt's administration and began with the passage of the
3 Exec. Order of Mar. 14, 1903, microformed on Presidential Executive
Orders and Proclamations, Fiche 1903-33-1 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
4 Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped
Resource, 8 ENV'rL. LAW. 215,216 (2001).
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966., This
Act created administrative and managerial guidelines that required a
refuge to meet an "original purpose" (a stated goal or purpose of the
refuge) and for new refuges to be compatible with these stated
purposes.6 Over thirty years later, Congress attempted to clarify this
"compatibility standard" in the National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act of 1977. The 1977 Act identifies the System's
mission as, "administer[ing] a national network of lands and waters
for the conservation, management, and where appropriate,
restor[ing]...the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats
within the United States for the benefit of present and future
generations of Americans. ' Today these National Wildlife Refuges
are the only federal lands that are administered primarily with the
goal ofbenefitting and protecting wildlife; they compromise over 520
individual units, and account for over ninety-three million acres of
habitat.9
ANILCA and the Creation of ANWR
ANWR's history dates back to 1943, when President Franklin
D. Roosevelt's administration set aside 67,440,000 acres of land in
Alaska's North Slope for possible oil production for use in the war
effort." The Arctic National Wildlife Range or "The Range" was
officially created under President Dwight D. Eisenhower's
administration in 1960."1 Under President Eisenhower, Interior
5 National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-669, 80 Stat. 927 (1966).
6 Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped
Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215, 219 (2001).
id.
8 National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act § 4(a), 16 U.S.C.
§668dd (1997).
9 Sherman, supra note 6, at 217.
10 Public Land Order 82, 8 Fed. Reg. 1599 (1942).
11 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215, 217 (2001).
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Secretary Fred Seaton set aside nine million acres of the original
67,440,000 with the goal of "preserv[ing] the 'unique wildlife,
wilderness and recreational values.'""' The leftover acreage remained
in its status as a "Range" while this nine million acres constituted a
smaller subsection for increased protection under the same title. 3
"The Range" continued under a limited level of federal
protection (with the ability to be leased and explored) until the oil
boom of the 1970's and the discovery of Prudhoe Bay's mineral
wealth, raising industry interests in the area and giving Congress
cause for concern regarding the "safety and status of federal land
holdings in northern Alaska."' 4 With President Carter's support,
Congress then took action in 1980 by passing the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)."5 ANILCA's purpose
was to provide more protection for areas designated as Ranges.'6
12 Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped
Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215, 217 (2001).
13 Id.; see also, Public Land Order 2214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598 (1960) (the
President's implied withdrawal authority, recognized in U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U.S. 459, 471-476 (1915), was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, but the Act did not invalidate valid land uses prior to its
enactment); Danford D. Grant, Protecting the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge
Without Section 1003: Will the Discretionary Requirements of Environmental &
Resource Management Statute Fill the Gap?, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.
47,48 (1997).
14 Todd Grover, Arctic Equity?: The Supreme Court's Resolution of United
States v. Alaska, 28 ENVTL. L. 1169, 1175(1998) (the original 64 million acres was
still available for exploration and the subset 9 million acres remained under this
umbrella title. The concern was for the removed 9 million acres to refrain from
exploration).
15 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-
3233 (1980).
16 Eleanor A. Hunt, Drilling for Oil Underneath the Arctic's Coastal Plain:
Proposal for Another Prudhoe Bay Environmental Disaster, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 189
(200 1) ("It is the intent of Congress... to preserve unrivaled scenic and geological
values associated with natural landscapes; to provide for the maintenance of sound
populations of, and habitat for, the wildlife species of inestimable value to the
citizens of Alaska and the Nation, including those species dependent on vast
relatively undeveloped areas; to preserve in their natural state extensive unaltered
ANILCA provides a basic "framework for managing subsistence
uses, mining and timber harvesting, and oil leasing on lands of
undeclared significance in Alaska."'17
After ratifying this legislation, Congress changed the status of
ANWR as a "Range" to a "Wildlife Refuge," which allowed Congress
to control mineral development and therefore provide greater federal
protection. 8 This change in status thus altered the title from its
original Arctic National Wildlife Range, to Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge. Congress also flexed it legislative muscle in the area of
protection and designated some eight million acres of ANWR as
Wilderness (Congressional action parallel to the President's authority
to create a refuge) therefore prohibiting any possibility of oil
exploration. 9 At the same time, Congress also expanded ANWR's
protected area from 9 million acres to include 19.8 million total acres,
therefore extending their control over more valuable Alaskan land.2"
arctic tundra, boreal forests, and coastal rainforest ecosystems; to protect the
resources related to subsistence needs; to protect and preserve historic and
archeological sites, rivers, and lands, and to preserve wilderness resource values
and related recreational opportunities."); see also Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1994).
17 Danford D. Grant, Protecting the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge Without
Section 1003: Will the Discretionary Requirements ofEnvironmental andResource
Management Statutes Fill the Gap?, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 47, 57
(1997).
18 Todd Grover, Arctic Equity?: The Supreme Court's Resolution of United
States v. Alaska, 28 ENVTL. L. 1169, 1175(1998) (by altering the "Range" to a
"Refuge" Congress comes closer to the original intent of conservation noted by
Secretary Seaton in 1960 because Congress has the ability to prohibit mineral
development in these Wildlife areas).
19 2 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, ALASKA, COASTAL PLAIN RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - -
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
FINAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 13 (N.K. Clough et al.
eds., 1987).
20 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAw. 215, 240 (2001).
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Protection of the "1002" Area and NEPA
After the passage of ANILCA and the designation of the
former "Range" as a "Wilderness," Congress withheld for study and
assessment some 1.5 million acres from the total 19.8 million acres
of ANWR under Section 1002 ("1002 Area," "the Area," or "Coastal
Plain") of the Act.2 This 1002 Area was to provide the government
with:
Assessment[s] of the fish and wildlife resources of the coastal
plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; an analysis of the
impacts of oil and gas exploration, development and production,
and...authorize exploratory activity within the coastal plain in a
manner that avoids significant adverse effects on the fish and
wildlife and other resources. 2
The 1002 Area is approximately 100 miles long and from 16
to 34 miles wide; almost 99% of the 1002 Area is classified as
wetlands, and a layer of organic living vegetation that is habitat for
many ecosystems covers much of the1002 Area. 3 Within the 1002
Area, there are four sections that have been identified as "areas with
special characteristics," 4 or areas with varying terrain, and fragile
ecosystems, and the Area has been recognized as "warranting special
attention."2" These were considerations in sectioning off the 1002
Area for greater federal control.
6
The federal government refrained from opening the 1002 Area
to exploration and decided to utilize Section 1002 as a study area to
21 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-
3103 (1980).
22 N.K. Clough et al., supra note 19, at 105.
23 Dan ford D. Grant, Protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Without
Section 1003: Will the Discretionary Requirements ofEnvironmental and Resource
Management Statutes Fill the Gap?, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 47,49-
50(1997).
24 Id. at 50.
25 ld. at 50-51.
26 Id at 51.
become informed about what steps should be taken in regards with
exploration and development. 27  Because it is situated between
massive oil producing fields in Canada and the United States and
therefore has the potential for successful oil exploration, the "1002
Area" was set aside for a decision about development to be made at
a later date.2"
Section 1002 was set aside for study through two important
mechanisms: first, through an assessment mechanism that requires an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)29 before any decision be made
on any proposed exploration; and second, through an enforcement
mechanism in Section 1003 that expressly prohibits any leasing or
exploration of the " 1002 Area" without an Act of Congress. 30 An EIS
is required for federal actions or for private actions that are then
approved by federal agencies which may "significantly affect [sic] the
quality of the human environment, ' 31 under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA).32 The United States Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia has interpreted NEPA's EIS requirement as
fulfilling the important purposes of carefully considering detailed
information, and making information available to audiences for
27 See Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped
Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215, 218 (2001) ("[T]he Senate - - caught between its
interest in potential oil and gas resources in that area of ANWR and its concern
about uncertain and conflicting information regarding the environmental risks of
development - - the plain represented a difficult choice: it could designate that land
as Wilderness, or it could reject'that title and open up the land to oil and gas
extraction and development Torn between the two options, Congress ultimately
postponed making any final decision about the plain until further study.").
2B Danford D. Grant, Protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Without
Section 1003: Will the Discretionary Requirements ofEnvironmental andResource
Management Statutes Fill the Gap?, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 47, 51
(1997).
29 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1969).
30 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101,
3143 (1980).
31 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(C)
(2000).
32 42 U.S.C. § 4322 (1994).
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input.33 The actual implementation of NEPA regulations continually
require a duty to update EIS reports when new information is
available that concerns the environment in connection with the action
proposal.34 Congressional action in the 1002 Area stemmed from
both a Report to Congress and a legislative EIS that were published
jointly by the Department of the Interior in 1987, constituting its
Final Legislative Environmental Impact Statement (Final LEIS)."
The Final LEIS, now 15 years old, is outdated and inaccurate.
Newer, more relevant information is available concerning the
environment and possible development strategies.36 The United
States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia suggests in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Lujan37 that Congress must consider a
supplemental EIS that would satisfy ANILCA requirements before
any federal action could allow development in ANWR. 31 In addition,
the original Final LEIS was itself inadequate when issued.39
Fundamentally, the Department of the Interior has not updated the
original 1987 Final LEIS or provided a supplemental NEPA EIS
incorporating any new information about ANWR or provided any
alternative proposals incorporating such information. After Lujan,
33 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v, Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 880 (D.D.C.
1991); see also Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped
Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215,218(2001) ("It ensures that the agency, in reaching
its decision [whether to go forward with the project], will have available and will
carefully consider detailed information concerning significant environmental
impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to
the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decision making process
and the implementation of that decision.").
34 Sherman, supra note 33, at 219.
35 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, ALASKA, COASTAL PLAIN RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - -
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
FINAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, (N.K. Clough et al. eds.,
1987).
36 Grant, supra note 28, at 55.
37 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1991).
38 Id. at 889.
39 Grant, supra note 28, at 56.
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potential plaintiffs could have standing for a NEPA challenge of the
original 1987 LEIS.40 In general, the Final LEIS cannot be considered
to be adequate after such a long period of time and with an abundance
of new information surrounding the environmental affects of
development in ANWR.4'
Part II: Native Interests in Prudhoe Bay and
Comparison with ANWR
One of the main stakeholders in any exploration or possible
development opportunities and subsequent consequences will be the
Native populations that inhabit the northern regions of Alaska. The
two main Native groups that will be reviewed here are the Gwich'in
Indians and the Inupiat Natives because they represent opposite
results from the experience in Prudhoe Bay's oil production and the
possible impact that exploration and development in ANWR may
have. The Inupiat Natives have benefitted economically from their
participation in the oil industry, but the Gwich'in Indians have seen
no benefits and are likely to lose their land, their subsistence, and
their culture if the oil industry prevails in exploration and production
in the 1002 Area.
In 1968, Prudhoe Bay, Alaska was found to hold some
approximately 10 billion barrels of oil.42 This discovery spurred oil
companies like Atlantic-Richfield Company (ARCO) and British
40 Sherman, supra note 33, at 220 (in Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Lujan, "[tihe U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
because 'NEPA clearly contemplates that the public should have an opportunity to
challenge the adequacy of environmental impact statements,' the Court conclude[d]
that plaintiffs have standing to challenge ... [such reports].").
41 Danford D. Grant, Protecting theArcticNational Wildlife Refuge Without
Section 1003: Will the Discretionary Requirements ofEnvironmental andResource
Management Statutes Fill the Gap?, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 47, 68
(1997).
42 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215, 242 (2001).
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Petroleum (BP) to quickly buy out land leases from the state of
Alaska in 1969. 43 With the land leases intact, and drilling production
ready to begin, the companies worried that unsettled titles to these
lands between the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN), the State of
Alaska, and the federal government might put their drilling operations
in jeopardy.44 The oil companies wanted to end this debate and begin
their operations under recognized absolute title to their leases and
lobbied Congress for a prompt settlement of the title claims with
those interested parties.45
ANCSA
Passage of ANCSA
In response to oil company lobbying to resolve the unsettled
.land titles, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
of 197146 which "extinguished native aboriginal rights to land in
Alaska in exchange for a cash settlement of $963 million and fee title
to 44 million acres of land."47 The Act created twelve Native Alaskan
regional corporations and various smaller village corporations.48 The
surface rights to these regional lands were to be controlled by the
village corporations while the subsurface rights were to be controlled
by the regional corporations.49 The Inupiat Natives fell under the
guidelines of ANCSA provisions, and were entitled to leasing
43 Id. at 242-243.
44 Id. at 243.
45 Id. ("In September, 1970, Frank Richwood, the president of British
Petroleum's Alaskan subsidiary, sent a letter to the House Interior Committee
demanding claims 'be speedily resolved in a manner that is fair and equitable to the
Natives, to the state of Alaska and to the U.S.").
46 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607 (1994).
47 Anthony R. Chase, Imminent Threat to America's Last Great Wilderness,
70 DENV. U. L. REv. 43,48 (1992).
49 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607.
49 Chase, supra note 47, at 48.
revenues from mineral development.5" However, Gwich'in Native
rights were governed by a pre-existing treaty that previously
established their rights to certain lands and the group did not to
participate in the Act's settlement provisions." Therefore, the
Gwich'in Natives retained rights to 1.8 million acres of land, but they
had no revenue rights from leasing as would the Inupiats under the
Terms of ANCSA; in addition, they stand to lose their subsistence
and cultural basis if development of ANWR is allowed. 2
Terms of ANCSA
Basically, ANCSA was both a land settlement program, under
which Native Alaskans received ownership to 40 million acres in fee
simple absolute in exchange for their total relinquishment of any
future claims, and a monetary compensation scheme." In the land
settlement part of the program, as long as Native claims did not
infringe on the claims of the federal government, state government,
land the state previously leased, or pre-existing private claims, the
Natives were given the opportunity to choose the lands they wanted.54
In effect, these restrictions provided that all land known or thought to
have oil remained entirely within control of the federal government,
Alaska, or leasees like ARCO and BP.55
so Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215,243-244 (2001).
s1 Id.
52 Anthony R. Chase, Imminent Threat to America's Last Great Wilderness,
70 DENy. U. L. REV. 43, 48 (1992) ("The Gwich'in's subsistence culture is rooted
in 10,000 years tradition. In the tight organized societal structure of subsistence
every member of the community plays a vital role in the mutual survival of the
group. The Gwich'in fear that if their chief survival resource disappears, the entire
social structure will erode.").
53 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8.ENVTL.
LAW. 215, 244 (2001); see also Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1603 (1994).
S4 Bornstein, supra note 53, at 244; see also Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1994).
35 Bornstein, supra note 53, at 244.
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Native Alaskans were also awarded $962 million in the
monetary part of the program. This money came as a $462 million
direct payment from congress, and approximately $500 million as a
two-percent share of profits from revenues of natural resources
recovered due to drilling in Prudhoe Bay. 6 After payment of this
$962 million, all compensation to Natives in the settlement agreement
ceased." The money is distributed and managed through the Alaska
Native Fund (ANF) to the Regional Corporations, which take half and
use them to fund community projects, and then distribute the
remainder to the Village Corporations under each Regional
Corporation.58 Because individual natives are a member of a
corporate tribe, each native individual can enroll to acquire shares and
thus hold stock in both the Regional and the Village Corporations. 9
This acquisition of shares gives each individual a yearly dividend of
approximately $600.60
ASRC: Benefits and Limitations
The Inupiat Natives have benefitted the most from Prudhoe
Bay oil production. The Inupiat formed the Arctic Slope Regional
Corporation (ASRC), which holds the subsurface rights outside the
1002 Area.6 ASRC received their choice of land with no oil revenue
possibilities after the settlement and received a distribution of $22.5
million from the Act's funds. 62 ASRC has profited by providing
services to oil companies operating in Prudhoe Bay. These services
include: building refineries for crude oil processing, building roads,
and creating other construction jobs continually necessary for
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 244-245.
59 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215, 245 (2001).
60 Id.
61 Anthony R. Chase, Imminent Threat to America's Last Great Wilderness,
70 DENV. U. L. REv. 43,48 (1992).
62 Bornstein, supra note 59, at 245.
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production.63 As a result of ASRC's resourcefulness, it is a major
producer of revenue and employment in Alaska, creating some $661
million for Alaska and producing some 5,900 jobs for Natives
throughout the region.64
While ASRC has benefitted Natives in some respects, there
are limitations and pitfalls in the structure and existence of ASRC as
well. One example is that many of the 5,900 jobs created by ASRC
for Inupiat Natives are only summer jobs and do not provide income
during the winter.65 As a consequence of this non-permanent
employment, Inupiats often rely completely on their savings and
ASRC dividend checks (approximately $600 a year; most of the
money is reallocated by the Regional Corporations into community
projects).66
Outside of the fact that most jobs are seasonal employment
opportunities, thejobs are also mainly available to those immediately
surrounding the oil activity itself, meaning that they are limited in
scope geographically. The reality is that Inupiats must travel great
distances from their villages to work for the oil industry and,
"although some Native Alaskans have been willing to live hundreds
of miles from home, others are unwilling to leave their families for
several months. ' 67 The farther from Prudhoe Bay one looks, the less
likely that Inupiats will be involved in the oil industry and the higher
the unemployment rate.68
63 Id.
64 Id
65 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215,245-246 (2001).
66 Id. at 246.
67 Id.
68 Id. (An example of the lack of employment opportunities is the village of
Wainwright, where only two Inupiat residents worked in the oil industry in 1990,
and the village of Kaktovik, where resident Inupiat have a thirty percent
unemployment rate).
20021
258 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.9
Inupiat Opportunities Should Congress Allow Drilling in ANWR
The Prudhoe Bay experience suggests that, for Inupiats who
live near ANWR, the relationship of ASRC to local oil companies
and their hiring process will be somewhat beneficial to the Inupiat's
employment opportunities.69 As noted above, residents living west
from the 1002 Area (Alaska's Coastal Plain) would be less inclined
to leave their families for months to obtain employment; therefore
those most likely to obtain a benefit from the decision to allow
drilling in ANWR would be those villages in the 1002 Area.7°
Outside these areas employment opportunities would be scarce.7
Inupiat ASRC members will obtain modest financial benefits
through leasing revenues should ANWR be opened to drilling.7"
Dividends will continue to grow for member shareholders but will
create only limited job opportunities.7 3 Because dividends are
distributed equally in the end, "[d]rilling in ANWR will create
modest prosperity for some Inupiats, but few benefits through job
opportunities for most."74 While all will receive some money because
of their shareholding, few will receive any permanent benefits from
the acquisition of jobs.
Gwich 'in Opportunities Should Congress Allow Drilling in ANWR
Because the Gwich'in Natives had land rights under a pre-
existing treaty, they opted out of the settlement agreement ANCSA
created; this decision would keep them from benefitting from
69 Id.
70 Id. (The ASRC village, and Kaktovik are the major villages that would be
considered in the 1002 Area).
71 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215, 246 (2001).
72 Id. at 247.
73 Id. at 253.
74 Id.
ANWR
economic opportunities that might arise from a decision to open
ANWR for drilling.
Benefits received in the form of jobs are mainly based on
participation in ASRC, and subsequently through ASRC's
"preferential hiring practices." s These preferential hiring practices
give employment priority for ASRC members over other candidates
and because the Gwich'in are not members of ASRC, they receive no
preferential hiring status. These practices mainly benefit the Inupiats
because of their status as ASRC members and because they are
situated nearer to the current oil production facilities. The Gwich'in
would be unable to participate because they are relatively isolated in
the ASRC Village and have minimal experience in oil industry jobs,
therefore it is less likely they would be qualified for employment over
other, more experienced, and "preferred" ASRC Inupiat workers.76
Furthermore, Gwich'in would not receive any dividend
benefits from oil drilling. Because the Gwich'in opted out of the
settlement agreement set forth in ANCSA, they also forfeited any
right to future dividends that might be payable as part of that
agreement." Finally, the only benefits the Gwich'in would find
would be a small increase in job opportunities for those with prior
work experience in the oil industry who live near these work sites.78
Outside this small benefit to a few Gwich'in, there are no positive
gains to be achieved from their perspective. While it is not important
to note all those groups who will not benefit from drilling in ANWR,
the Gwich'in economic situation is just another example of the stark
contrast to that of the Inupiat in the comparison between the two
groups.
73 Id at 247.
76 Id.
77 Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1988).
78 Matthew W. Bomstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215,247 (2001).
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Creation of NSB and Forecast for Opportunities in ANWR
After originally working with the Natives for a quick
settlement, the oil companies' and the Native's mutual satisfaction
over their economic relationship soon deteriorated because the
Inupiats pushed for more economic gain.7 9
To maximize their economic benefits in oil industry invasion
into the North Slope, the Inupiat formed the North Slope Borough
(NSB), a municipal unit with the right and authority to tax."0 The oil
companies challenged the authority of the NSB in State court to
create and impose tax obligations but lost as NSB was found to
political unit with the authority to tax."'
However, the oil companies efforts to limit NSB's tax
authority, or completely dismember it as a political unit, did give the oil
companies a small victory; in 1972 Alaska implemented a tax ceiling
upon NSB and defined how these taxes would be imposed." After
years of battling the oil companies over NSB's authority to exceed this
tax cap, in 1976 Alaska found that NSB could exceed this tax ceiling
79 Id. at 248.
80 Id. at 249.
81 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Comm'n, 518 P.2d 92 (Alaska 1974)
(the oil companies asserted that Alaska's Local Boundary Commission had illegally
created the North Slope Borough by ignoring the Alaska Legislature's guidelines.
The court found that the Commission had not abused its discretion and NSB was
a valid political unit).
82 Bornstein, supra note 78, at 249-250 (Alaska law provides two means of
limiting taxes under statute: "(b) A municipality may levy and collect a tax on the
full and true amount of taxable property under AS 43.56 as valued by the Dept. of
Revenue at a rate not to exceed that which produces an amount of revenue from the
total municipal property tax equivalent to $1500 a year for each person residing
within its boundaries... and ... (c) [a] municipality may levy and collect a tax on
the full and true value of that portion of that taxable property under AS 43.56 as
assessed by the Dept. of Revenue which, when combined with the value of
property otherwise taxable by the municipality, does not exceed the product of 225
percent of the average per capita assessed full and true value of property in the state
multiplied by the number of residents of the taxing municipality."); see ALASKA
STAT. § 29.45.080 (b)-(c) (Michie 2000).
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when using these tax revenues to pay debt services on bonds.8 3 Since
this time, NSB has maintained the authority to tax Prudhoe Bay
operations."' The relationship this has to drilling in ANWR is that the
NSB believes that the Prudhoe Bay operations have set precedent for
them to continue their taxing scheme in ANWR as well; this may not
be the case though, as ANWR is currently federally controlled and the
state has no power over this land.
The result of NSB's ability to tax has been great benefits and
monetary profits for Inupiats. By the end of the 1970's approximately
two-thirds of NSB revenues originated from these taxes, accounting
for nearly fifty million dollars yearly. 5 NSB uses these profits by
implementing Capital Improvement Projects (CIPs)."6 From 1980 -
1985, NSB used $138.4 million in tax revenues to provide services
in the community such as health facilities, firehouses, roads, schools,
drainage systems, and houses.8 7 As well as monetary benefits that are
transformed into CIP benefits for the community, these CIPs have
created a great number of highly paid jobs for NSB residents, i.e., in
the early 1980's 159 full time jobs could be found in a village of 506
people, 31 part time jobs were available, and 120 jobs were created
by NSB projects.88
However, the improvements the ability to tax created have
ultimately resulted in a community weakness: NSB is entirely
dependent upon the oil industry for its economy; thus the munici-
pality has been unable to form an economy that will provide for NSB
residents independent of the oil industry. 9 NSB's profits are very
sensitive to changes in oil prices, and since most of their profits are
83 N. Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534 (Alaska 1978).
84 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215,250 (2001).
83 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 250-251.
89 Id. at 25 1.
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used to create CIPs, many of these projects are created or cancelled
depending upon economic fluctuations.9"
The forecast for taxing ANWR is, however, bleak. The
benefits NSB has derived from the Prudhoe Bay might not continue
with development in ANWR and Inupiats will suffer the same
Gwich'in losses by being unable to recover any financial benefit from
oil operations.9 Inupiats will suffer the same losses because there is
currently no language in potential legislation that would grant NSB
any authority to tax or receive monetary benefits from opening
ANWR.92 The Native financial interests in opening ANVTR are thus
limited to jobs/revenues created through ASRC membership because
it seems unlikely that NSB will have any taxing authority over
ANWR development. The Native's stand on drilling thus relates to
their perceived opportunities stemming from drilling. The Inupiats
believe that drilling will bring them increased economic advantages
and jobs, therefore they support drilling, and the Gwich'in perceive
great consequences to their culture with relatively no opportunities,
therefore they oppose drilling.
Part III: Alaska's Interest in ANWR
The state of Alaska has a significant interest in the decision to
open ANWR for oil exploration and subsequent production:
90 Matthew W. Bornstein, The Economics of Mixed Blessings, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 215, 251 (2001) ("[iun the mid-1980s, oil prices slumped, causing the
cancellation of many CIP projects. The dip eliminated about ten percent of
Wainwright's full-time jobs.").
91 Id. at 252.
92 Id. at 252-253 ("On August 1,2001, the House passed the Arctic Coastal
Plain Domestic Energy Security Act of 2001 ... [t]he bill is silent in reference to
Native Alaskans... it makes no mention of allowing NSB to tax the production of
oil or of creating a revenue-sharing program with Native Alaskans. Without an
explicit provision allowing taxation, NSB cannot tax the federal leases or the
production of oil on federal land. No such revenue-sharing provision is included
in the bill."); see also Arctic Coastal Plain Domestic Energy Security Act of 200 1,
H.R. 39, 107th Cong. (2001).
economics. Alaska has no income tax, and is highly dependent upon
oil production royalties from current Prudhoe Bay operations for
revenue and its budget. 3 Oil is the driving force behind the state's
economy and accounts for three-quarters of the budget per year.94
These revenues prevent state citizens from having to pay a state
income or sales tax and also provide to citizens a yearly dividend,
which in year 2000 was a $1,963.86 payment.95
The state's interest is not with the environmental protection
of the ecosystems, the preservation of the wildlife, or the
conservation of what mineral resources lie beneath the surface, but
with the economic benefits that oil production will bring to Alaska.
Oil industry proponents believe that Alaska's extreme climate, high
living expenses, health care costs, and transportation costs justify
Alaska's dependence upon the oil industry.96 Despite Alaska's
dependency upon oil production for revenue, Alaska still receives ihe
highest amount of federal money, lending to its reputation as "the last
great welfare state."97 Opening ANWR to drilling would give Alaska
a potential $2.5 billion annual benefit in royalties alone, with further
benefits from resource sales of gravel and water to the oil industry
and road construction.98 These interests further fuel the State's desire
to open ANWR.9 9 The state proponents (Representative Don Young,
Senator's Frank Murkowski and Ted Stevens, Governor Tony
93 Todd Grover, Arctic Equity?: The Supreme Court's Resolution of United
States v. Alaska, 28 ENVTL. L. 1169, 1170 (1998).
94 Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped
Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215,233 (2001).
93 Id.
96 ld
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. ("However, this is far from certain: although the current statutory
regime calls for Alaska to receive to ninety percent of certain revenues, many
supporters of development are calling for an even split with the federal
government, and a federal court has indicated Congress has the right to alter the
percentage."); see also Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685 (Fed. CI. 1996),
aff'd, 119 F.3d 16 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Knowles, and a vast majority of the state legislature) base their
argument simply on the grounds that opening ANWR for production
will create a mass influx of jobs, bolstering the state economy. 00
Because of its dependence upon oil revenue, Alaska has a great
interest in maintaining its control over the economic benefits of any
future developments in oil production within the state; the
environmentalist voice is not great enough in Alaska to counteract the
dependency upon oil revenue.
Alaska v. United States and Revenue Consequences
Alaska currently receives ninety-percent of all oil lease
revenues, and would like to continue this incentive if production
begins in ANWR. In Alaska v. United States, however, the Federal
Claims Court held that the Alaska Statehood Act included neither a
promise on the part of the federal government to pay the state ninety
percent of gross mineral leasing revenues from federal mineral leases
in perpetuity, nor an implied promise to make federal mineral lands
productive of state royalty revenues.' The State argued that
statements made by former Interior Secretary Fred Seaton in 1958
that, "[since] early this year the Territory has received 90 percent of
all oil lease revenues; the State of Alaska will continue to do so," was
binding in law.0 2 The court held that to be enforceable, an obligation
of the federal government to the state must be in writing,
subsequently adopted by Congress and ratified by the State of
100 Eleanor A. Hunt, Drillingfor Oil Underneath the Arctic's Coastal Plain.
Proposal for Another Prudhoe Bay Environmental Disaster, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 189,
207-208 (2001) ("Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates (WEFA)
conducted an economic analysis, finding that as many 73.6,000 jobs would be
created if oil development in ANWR occurred . . . The probable types of
employment include, manufacturing (128,000); mining, including oil (84,000);
trade (225,000); services (145,000); construction (135,000); and finance, insurance
real estate (1 9,000) jobs.").
101 Alaska v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 685, 706 (Fed. Cl. 1996).
102 Id.
Alaska.' 3 The court concluded that Alaska relied too heavily upon"
the Secretary's words that carried very little permanent weight. 04
The end result of Alaska v. United States is the probability that
Alaska will not have as large a right to revenues in ANWR as it did
in Prudhoe Bay should drilling be allowed; almost certainly not at its
current ninety-percent share status.'05
United States v. Alaska and Word Interpretation in the Alaska
Statehood Act
In July of 1958, Congress passed the Alaska Statehood Act."0 6
Within this act were two subsections of great importance in a future
battle that would rage between federal and state control of the 1002
Area (Coastal Area) of ANWR: Sections 6(e) and 6(m) of the Alaska
Statehood Act.
Section 6(e) gave Alaska all property "previously used by the
federal government 'for the sole purpose of conservation and
protection' of the territory's fish and wildlife."' 7 This seemingly
broad grant over lands that would have included ANWR was limited
in Section 6(e)'s reservation clause, which reserved for the federal
103 Id.
104 Id
os Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped
Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215, 221 (2001).
106 Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-805, 72 Stat. 339 (1958);
see also Todd Grover, Arctic Equity?: The Supreme Court's Resolution of United
States v. Alaska, 28 ENVTL. L. 1169, 1173 (1998) ("The Statehood Act is essentially
Alaska's organic legislation. It provided for Alaska's admission to the Union on
equal footing with all other states and expressly declared Alaska's subservient
position within the American system of constitutional federalism. Further, the
Statehood Act granted Alaska a specified amount of federal public lands: nearly
thirty percent of the public lands then available in the territory-well over one
hundred million acres.").
107 Grover, supra note 106, at 1173.
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government all "lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or
reservations for the protection of wildlife."108
Section 6(m) applied the Submerged Land Act of 1953 to
Alaska."°9 The Act gave Alaska rights to submerged lands within
three miles of the state's northern coast."' However, section 6(m)
also included a reservation provision similar to that of section 6(e)
that reserved all lands for the federal government that were "expressly
retained" by the government."' The importance of these clauses
became apparent when Interior Secretary Fred Seaton, upon the
establishment of ANWR, made formal withdrawal of these lands in
1960.1 " This withdrawal suggested that these lands were, in fact,
subject for withdrawal by the government, therefore upon passage of
the Alaska Statehood Act, the government had already reserved these
lands. 13
Federal control over ANWR has continued since this with-
drawal and management has successfully furthered the government's
goals to preserve the unique wildlife, wilderness, and recreational
values." 4 The fact that the federal government controls ANWR is
important because it means any decision to drill in ANWR would be
108 Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-805, 72 Stat. 339, 340-341
(1958) (section 6(e) provides that: "[a]ll real and personal property of the United
States situated in the Territory of Alaska which is specifically used for the sole
purpose of conservation and protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska..
. shall be transferred and conveyed to the State of Alaska by the appropriate
Federal agency . . . [p]rovided, [t]hat such transfer shall not include lands
withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection o
wildlife nor facilities utilized in connection therewith.").
109 Grover, supra note 106, at 1174.
110 Id.
Ut Id. ("When read together, these provisions transferred all coastal
submerged lands to the State, yet reserved any lands that the federal government
had previously and expressly retained.").
112 Todd Grover, Arctic Equity?: The Supreme Court's Resolution of United
States v. Alaska, 28 ENVTL. L. 1169, 1175 (1998).
113 Id.
114 Id.
a national decision rather than a state decision, suggesting that "[tihe
Supreme Court was undoubtedly aware of this fact when it rendered
its decision in United States v. Alaska.""5
United States v. Alaska maintained that the federal govern-
ment retained control of ANWR and the submerged lands in question.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor differentiated,
"withdrawn" from "otherwise set apart," as meaning two separate
things to avoid redundancy in language." 6  Justice O'Connor
interpreted "otherwise set apart" not to mean that there must have
been a refuge at time of the Alaska Statehood Act, but that there was
in process a means of setting apart these lands." 7 Because of the
ambiguity in the language "withdrawn or otherwise set apart," the
Court used a general canon of statutory construction, "construing
ambiguous public land grants in favor of the federal grantor.""' 8 The
Court utilizes this canon to protect an overriding national interest,
such as "maintaining public lands from particular grantees who seek
additional rights beyond what was expressly granted." 119 Because the
State of Alaska here was openly expressing its intent to develop oil
and gas operations in ANWR, the Court was more sympathetic to the
federal government's interests in protecting the wildlife and
wilderness as it has since 1960.12'
15 Id. at 1177.
116 United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 30 (1997) ("The Court will avoid an
interpretation of a statute that 'renders some words altogether redundant."')
(citations omitted).
117 Id. at 30 (The Court disagreed that the federal government would retain
lands only if the wildlife or reservation existed at the passage of statehood. The
Court reads Congress' intent as providing no limitation in §6(e) only to completed
reservations, but to those areas that were also otherwise set apart as refugees for the
protection of wildlife. "Accordingly, the application and regulation, taken together,
placed the Range squarely within the proviso of §6(e), preventing a transfer of
lands covered by the application to Alaska.").
Ila Todd Grover, Arctic Equity?: The Supreme Court's Resolution of United
States v. Alaska, 28 ENVTL. L. 1169, 1181 (1998).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1181-1182.
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Part IV: International Interests in ANWR
One of the more overlooked interests considered in whether
or not to subject ANWR to oil development are international treaty
obligations. United States international treaty obligations are one of
the purposes behind creating ANWR, and another purpose was
unambiguously identified in ANILCA through "fulfill[ing] inter-
national treaty obligations of the United States with respect to fish
and wildlife and their habitats."' 2
The Final LEIS submitted by the Secretary of the Interior in
April, 1987, indicates that ANWR must be managed to fulfill all
international treaty obligations of the United States with respect to
fish, wildlife, and their habitats. 122 Despite this clear obligation, the
Secretary still recommended passing legislation to open ANWR's
entire coastal plain basing his decision solely on the Final LEIS
report and ignoring treaty obligations.'13 Moreover, although the
Final LEIS notes seven distinct treaties relating to fish and wildlife
that use the ANWR coastal plain, it does not discuss the obligations
such treaties would place on the United States, much less how these
obligations and oil exploration could be met simultaneously. 24 In
recommending that ANWR be opened, the Secretary never even
acknowledged the prior existence of such international agreements. 125
Treaties ratified through the advice and consent of the Senate
are entered into by the President and have the same effect as an act of
121 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §
303(2)(B)(ii) (1982).
122 James Walker, Oil Development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
and its Impact on United States International Wildlife Commitments, 4 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. Fall 1992, at 3-4.
123 Id
124 Id at 5.
125 Id.
Congress.2 6 It is important to note that breaching a treaty would, in
all likelihood, not prevent any leasing and development strategies, but
it may result in damages being paid to those countries showing
harm. 27 However, violating an international treaty is not considered
a light matter and will not be inferred or recognized without express
congressional intent.' Therefore, Congress could make the decision
to act through legislation that authorizes oil development, essentially
voiding international obligations, and the Secretary would be relieved
of any duty to both explore for oil and simultaneously protect
international obligations. 9 The United States, however, would still
be liable for damages under any such violated treaties. 30
One of the largest groups of treaties at issue involves
migratory birds and their habitat. The United States has entered into
126 Id. at 6 ("If a treaty and an act of Congress are in conflict on an issue, then
the most recently enacted is the valid authority and the earlier one is to be
disregarded.").
127 Danford D. Grant, Protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Without
Section 1003: Will the Discretionary Requirements ofEnvironmental andResource
Management Statutes Fill the Gap?, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 47, 83
(1997).
128 James Walker, Oil Development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
and its Impact on United States International Wildlife Commitments, 4 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. Fall 1992, at 6-7.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 7.
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treaties with Japan, 3' Mexico,' and Canada'33 regarding migratory
birds. There are currently 135 species of birds that use ANWR's
coastal plain and these treaties protect 130 of them.
34
The Canada and Mexico treaties have no commitment to bird
habitat protection and the Japan treaty only requires that the parties
look to establish areas that will protect or manage these migratory
birds. '3 Opening ANWR to development would detrimentally
impact the coastal plain habitat used by the birds protected under
these international treaties because it affects the migratory patterns
and feeding patterns of the birds themselves. 36 This impact would
subsequently affect the decision to develop in this area economically
131 Convention for the Protection of Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds
in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972, U.S.-Japan, 25
U.S.T. 3329.
132 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals,
Feb. 7, 1936, U.S.-Mex., 50 Stat. 1311; see also James Walker, Oil Development
in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and its Impact on UnitedStates International
Wildlife Commitments, 4 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. Fall 1992, at 8 n. 41 ("This treaty
protects only birds that migrate between Mexico and the United States. It lists 31
protected families of birds. Members of 12 of these families (represented by 71
species) use the coastal plain of ANWR, however, it is not clear how many of these
birds migrate to Mexico.").
133 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-
U.K., 39 Stat. 1702.
134 Walker, supra note 133, at 9.
135 Id. at 10.
136 Id. at 11 -13 (Walker uses Snow Geese as a prime example of how the
treaty violation would affect these migratory birds: "Snow geese do not use the
coastal plain of ANWR for nesting or during their spring migration north.
However, up the 325,000 snow geese use the coastal plain for staging each year
prior to their fall migration south. Staging is the process where the birds rest and
feed so as to accumulate s[u]fficient body fat to fly non-stop the 1,300 miles to the
next staging area normally used. Failure of the geese to accumulate sufficient body
fat results in increased mortality during migration. According to the U.S.
Department of the Interior, opening the ANWR coastal plain for development of
oil would result in direct loss of up to 47% of the snow geese grazing habitat in the
coastal plain.").
ANWR
because of the substantial cost of international negotiations and
required restitution damages.'37
In addition to the treaties covering migratory birds, The
United States is also a participant to a treaty protecting polar bears. 38
This treaty was enacted in response to the decline in polar bear
population in their traditional ranges in northern regions and because
their chances of survival are limited due to their low birth rates. 39
Again, the Final LEIS created by the Secretary of the Interior in 1987
recognized that this treaty existed, but took no additional steps to
address any obligations or involvement in the Final LEIS.' 40 Because
there would be a noted impact upon the polar bears in this region (the
Northern Alaska sub-group) and because there are feasible options to
avoid such adverse impacts, any development would be considered
a material breach of treaty obligations.'14
Finally, although the United States is not a party to any treaty
protecting the Porcupine Caribou Herd (PCH), there is a current
executive agreement'42 between Canada and the United States with
the goal of conserving the herd and protecting subsistence dependent
Natives, "by minimizing long-term adverse impacts to the herd and
its habitat so that opportunity for subsistence use of this resource by
37 Id. at 16.
13a Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973,U.S.-Nor.,
27 U.S.T. 3918 (The United States is party along with Canada, Denmark, and
Norway).
139 James Walker, Oil Development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
and its Impact on United States International Wildlife Commitments, 4 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. Fall 1992, at 16 (Polar bears average only 1.58 live births per
pregnancy).
140 Id at 16-17.
141 Id. at 18 ("The population of this sub-group has been very stable at about
2,500-3,000, with mortality rates and birth rates being identical." The fact that this
group is at zero population growth and that any development would adversely
affect the bears would be crucial in considering such a breach to be material and
significant by other parties).
142 Agreement on the Conservation of Porcupine Caribou Herd, July 17,
1987, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11259.
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Canadian Native and rural Alaskans remains available."'' 43 The
executive agreement requires both Canada and the United States to,
"take appropriate action to conserve the [PCH] and its habitat."' 44
Simply because there is no legally binding treaty protecting the PCH
does not mean that this executive agreement can be ignored outright;
in fact ANILCA states that, "the [PCH] has been acknowledged to be
a significant international resource and thus the United States has an
obligation under international customary law to protect this herd." 
45
In considering whether to open ANWR to oil exploration and
production, it is necessary to consider the cost of breaching these
international obligations under the various migratory bird treaties, the
polar bear treaties, and the executive agreement regarding care of the
PCH and their habitat. Without considering these obligations, the
decision whether to open ANWR is biased because:
It fails to consider the political cost to the United States of
blatantly violating a number of international obligations ...
[which may] have an adverse impact on national security, but
more importantly it would adversely impact the United States'
ability to convince other countries to protect common resources.
This could lead to environmental degradation, which in the long
run may be the greatest threat to national security the United
States faces. 146
143 Walker, supra note 140, at 11..
144 Executive Agreement, supra note 139, at Art. Ill (3)(a).
145 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§306(a), 94 Stat. 2371 (1980); see also James Walker, Oil Development in the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and its Impact on United States International
Wildlife Commitments, 4 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. Fall 1992, at 12 ("The source of this
customary international law appears to go back to the beginning of Christian
civilization and the need ofemerging nations to minimize conflicts. The obligation
of a nation to not abuse natural resources to the detriment of others is a basic part
of the English common law of torts, which both the United States and Canada have.
adopted. This obligation is recognized as a 'general principle of law' enforced
under Article 38(l)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which
both the United States and Canada are parties to.").
146 Walker, supra note 146, at 15.
Part V: Wildlife Interests in ANWR
New Report141
On March 28th, 2002, the U.S. Department of the Interior
reported to Congress in a seventy-eight page report titled, "Arctic
Refuge Coastal Plain Terrestrial Wildlife Research Summaries," the
results of twelve years of biological research and assessment on the
wildlife in ANWTR."4 ' The report has stirred the political maelstrom
surrounding ANWR once again, with the Bush administration
seeking to require an additional U.S. Geological Survey review of the
effects of drilling in ANWR, in essence denying the validity of the
original report. 14
9
In response to the study, those in favor of protecting ANWR
rallied around its scientific findings; Senator Joseph Lieberman (Demo-
crat - Connecticut) stated, "[o]nce again the administration has released
a report undermining its own case for opening the Arctic Refuge to oil
drilling ... [the report] confirmed the environmental destruction that
would occur."' 50  The science behind the biological assessment is
147 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC REFUGE
COASTAL PLAIN TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE RESOURCE SUMMARIES, (D.C. Douglas et
al. eds., 2002) ("Contributions to this report were made by scientists affiliated with
the U.S. Geological Survey; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; Alaska Department of
Fish and Game; University of Alaska-Fairbanks; Canadian Wildlife Service;
Yukon Department of Renewable Resources; and the Northwest Territories
Department of Resources, Wildlife, and Economic Development. Sections of the
report presenting new information on caribou and forage plants were peer-reviewed
by three independent, non-affiliated scientists. The remaining sections summarize
previously published peer-reviewed scientific papers and were reviewed by a single
independent scientist. The U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service collaborated in the publication of this report.").
148 H. Josef Herbert, Government Report Says Drilling May Put Alaska
Wildlife at Risk, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, March 29, 2002, at A3.
149 Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Senator Questions Needfor New Study ofANWR
Drilling, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, April 5, 2002, at A3.
IS0 Herbert supra note 149.
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credible, as it is reviewed by a peer-review process and outside objective
parties. The political efforts to discredit the biological assessment by
requiring a new report would not be reviewed under such standards. 5'
The original report should be considered a good example of how science
and policy-making should interplay and should not be discredited
because of political desire to drill in ANWR."'
Impact of Drilling
Pristine Ecosystems
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service summarized the impor-
tance of ANWR as an example of a pristine ecosystem by saying:
[The Refuge is] America's finest example of an intact, naturally
functioning community of arctic/subarctic ecosystems...such a
broad spectrum of diverse habitats occurring within a single
protected unit is unparalleled in North America, and perhaps in
the entire circumpolar north.
153
There are many reasons that ecosystems in ANWR would be
subjected to severe detrimental impact should drilling occur.
ANWR's fragility is due to a multitude of factors relating to arctic
151 O'Rourke, supra note 150, at A3 ("Senator Lieberman, chairman of the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, suggested that the call for the additional
review was politically motivated: 'In my view, any additional analyses should stem
from the same exhaustive research and meet the same rigorous scientific analysis
as that which the Department released last week, rather than meeting a politically
motivated deadline."').
152 Id. at A3 (Lieberman states that the report was a "good example of how
science can help provide policy-makers with objective, thorough, and unbiased
information... [the report] made clear what other scientists have stated: that oil
development in the Arctic Reserve coastal plain would pose a substantial risk to
wildlife populations, including caribou, musk oxen, snow geese and polar bears.
It also affirms the unique and incomparable ecological and wilderness values of the
coastal plain.").
153 Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped
Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215,226 (2001).
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temperatures, such as slow decomposition of pollutants, slow
regeneration of vegetation, concentrations of species, greater
significance of marine areas, susceptibility to global warming trends,
and difficulty of cleanup. 54
Perhaps the greatest detrimental effect would be the damage
to water resources. A major purpose of creating the Arctic Refuge
was to protect the quality and quantity of the Refuge's water
system.' Wetlands cover the Coastal Plain and low evaporation
rates and permafrost layers allow the area to be very productive
biologically during the summer months. 56 As well as the importance
of water in wetlands, the availability of water becomes a limiting
factor for those who promote drilling based on new technology.
These technologies create "ice roads""' and require an abundance of
water supply to construct-nearly some 1.35 million gallons of water
per one mile of road.' In addition, drilling for oil requires water
resources; some 30,000 gallons of water a day is required to operate
a single well for exploration.'59 Among the nine major rivers that run
through ANWR Coastal Plain in the summer, about 9 million gallons
of water is available; the remaining water required for development
would have to be piped in from the Beaufort Sea and subsequently
treated in a desalinization plant. 60
134 Id. at 227.
155 Danny L. Eidson, Why Congress Should Grant Wilderness Status to the
Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 7 S.C. ENVT'L. L. J. 209,223
(1998); see also Alaska National Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§303(2)(B)(v), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980) ("to ensure, to the maximum extent
practicable and in a manner with the consistent with the purposes set forth in
paragraph (i), water quality and necessary water quantity within the refuge.").
156 Eidson, supra note 156, at 223.
157 Sherman, supra note 154, at 227 ("temporary ice pads and six-inch thick
ice roads that melt away in the spring.").
158 Eidson, supra note 156, at 224.
159 Id.
160 Id. (The requirements for such abundance of water in the development and
production of oil extraction would cause an extremely detrimental impact upon the
water resources in ANWR, Edison says, "[tihe negative effects of oil development
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The damage upon the ecosystems from this overuse of natural
water supplies would be borne mostly by fish. Danny Eidson, a
prolific author on ANWR, suggests that "moderate" effects would be
the result through "lost or reduced habitat values, inhibited
movements and direct mortality,"' 6' and "major" negative effects
would result through oil spills in these water habitats. 62 Considering
that ANILCA's mandate is to avoid degradation and destruction of
water quality and quantity, using all the resources of water in the
Coastal Plain could be considered a "clear material impairment of
ANILCA's purpose [in this goal]."'63
Vegetation and habitat are another aspect of this pristine
ecosystem that would be greatly affected by drilling. As well as
protecting water ecosystems, ANILCA also seeks to "conserve ...
populations and habitats in their natural diversity."' 164 Because of the
fragile nature of these arctic and subarctic ecosystems, ANILCA
on the water resources of the Coastal Plain are undeniable. In its assessment of
predicted water usage on the Coastal Plain, the Baseline Study stated that 'water
for drilling and production requirements would be difficult to obtain in sufficient
quantities on the study area, so combinations of some or all sources mat be
necessary.' The LEIS concluded that the 'dedicated industrial use of the limited
natural fresh-water sources of the 1002 coastal plain area would have a major
effect."').
161 Danny L. Eidson, Why Congress Should Grant Wilderness Status to the,
Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 7 S.C. ENVT'L. L. J. 209,225
(1998).
162 ld at 225.
163 Id.
16 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§303(2)(B)(i), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980) ("to conserve fish and wildlife
populations and habitats in their natural diversity including, but not limited to, the
Porcupine caribou herd (including participation in coordinated ecological studies
and management of this herd and the Western Arctic caribou herd), polar bears,
grizzly bears, muskox, DalI sheep, wolves, wolverines, snow geese, peregrine
falcons and other migratory birds and Arctic char and grayling.").
ANWR
seeks to protect the entire spectrum of ecosystems.165 The multiple
and diverse species of vegetation is important for sustaining other
wildlife species,166 thus the Refuge has a "relatively short food chain
and 'the loss of one component can have disastrous consequences for
other dependent species.""' 67 The immediate and permanent damage
to vegetation and habitat would be extensive and irreparable because
of changes in drainage patters, use of gravel in construction,
conversion of land to roads and drilling platforms, oil and diesel
spills, and a wide variety of other damaging consequences. 68 The
165 Eidson, supra note 162, at 225 ("Arctic ecosystems are very sensitive to
stress because the Arctic has low species diversity, and those species grow and
mature slowly.").
166 Id. at 226 ("The Coastal Plain is continuously vegetated with sedges,
grasses, mosses, lichens, small herbs, and dwarf shrubs, all of which are essential
components of the tundra ecosystem. Plant production in the arctic is responsible
for 90% of the energy flow. Arctic vegetation also provides food and shelter for
wildlife and influences the hydrological cycle. Most vegetation in the Arctic
Refuge is than one foot high, except along streambeds, or along south-facing slopes
where the active layer of the permafrost is thicker. The plants are sensitive [and)
a change in microtopography of less than one meter can have a 'major influence'
on the distribution of plant communities in the arctic. In addition, minor changes
in elevation create draining of water in lower areas, which in turn affects biomass
production. As a result, a change in water and nutrient availability can create
dramatic changes in biomass within the space of one meter.").
167 Sheila Weigert, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate Over
Drilling in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, the Environment is the Only True Loser, 8
ENVTL. LAW. 169, 175 (2001).
168 Id at 176-177 ("Thousands of acres of existing vegetation would be lost
due to coverage by 'roads, pipelines, airstrips and other support facilities.' The
impact of drilling development could alter the 'natural drainage patterns, causing
changes in vegetation.' Vegetation modification also could result from the
'secondary effects of gravel spray and dust deposition, altered snowmelt and
erosion patterns.' For example, dust deposits along proposed roads in the coastal
plain would alter vegetation in a much broader area than that of the actual size of
the road. Additionally, any spills due to drilling exploration and development
could cause negative effects on areas of vegetation. Leaks, ruptured lines and
overturned tanks usually cause spills of diesel fuel, gasoline, oil, and antifreeze.
Biologists conclude that 'diesel fuel is highly toxic and kills all plants on contact.'
Furthermore, oil spills in direct contact with vegetation usually cause immediate
2002]
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overall effects on vegetation and habitat ecosystems are a small
segment of the irreversible results that would stem from drilling in
ANWR's Coastal Plain.
Caribou
The most recent and reliable source of information regarding
the affect that drilling would have upon the caribou herds existing in
ANWR's 1002 Area is the new report noted earlier completed in
damage to aboveground vegetation. Oil spills that are deep and penetrate the soil
can cause areas of vegetation to remain toxic for years."); see also Danny L.
Eidson, Why Congress Should Grant Wilderness Status to the Coastal Plain of the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 7 S.C. ENVT'L. L. J. 209, 227-228 (1998)
("According to the LEIS, direct impacts on vegetation and habitat caused by the
infrastructure of oil drilling would be expected to last 'well beyond the life of the
project.' Oil production is expected to last between thirty and fifty years.
Construction of roads, pipelines, airstrips, and other facilities would destroy an
estimated 5,650 acres of vegetation. Additional damage would occur as a result of
gravel mining. Gravel is used to provide stable foundations for all facilities such
as drill pads, roads, airstrips, pipelines, and buildings. Oil development in the
arctic requires a great deal of gravel-over 60 million cubic yards of gravel was
used to construct over 300 miles of roads at the complex at Prudhoe Bay. Gravel
mining would be a source of long term damage to riparian habitats along river and
stream beds and upland areas. High density development would require gravel
dredging from river and stream beds and open pit mines dug in the upland terraces
and thaw lake plains. Vegetation would be destroyed in the areas dredged, in the
areas covered by the stockpiling of the top layer of soil, and by the subsequent
erosion. The river environments that would be impacted by dredging are among
the most complex in the Arctic Refuge; they are of particular concern because of
their importance to wildlife and because they cover 25% of the Coastal Plain.
Gravel mines on the thaw lake plain would impact primarily wet sedge tundra.
Once abandoned, the mines would fill with water. Successful rehabilitation of
gravel mines has not been accomplished at Prudhoe Bay. Oil development also
indirectly damages arctic vegetation. Over 7,000 acres of vegetation would be
damaged or destroyed by gravel spray, spills of diesel fuel, oil, and seawater,
altered erosion and snow melt patterns. Spills of diesel fuel, oil, and seawater are
an inevitable result of oil development.").
2002.169 This report makes the following conclusions in regards to
the Porcupine Caribou Herd (PCH) and ANWR's Coastal Plain:
In summary, 4 research-based ecological arguments indicate
that the PCH may be particularly sensitive to development within the
1002 portion of the calving ground-
Low productivity of the PCH-The PCH has had the lowest
capacity for growth among Alaska barren ground herds (4.9%) and
is the only barren ground herd in Alaska known to be in decline
throughout the 1990s. This low growth rate indicates that the PCH
has [a low] capacity to accommodate anthropogenic, biological, and
abiotic stresses...
Demonstrated shift of concentrated calving areas of the
Central Arctic caribou herd away from petroleum development
infrastructures-It is assumed that the PCH caribou will avoid roads
and pipelines during calving...if development of the 1002 Area
occurs. Avoidance of petroleum development infrastructure by
parturient caribou during the first few weeks of the lives of the calves
is the most consistently observed behavioral response of caribou to
development.
Lack of high-quality alternate calving habitat-...Diet quality
on the Canadian portions of the calving ground was substantially
lower than on the Arctic Refuge coastal plain and 1002 Area portions
of the calving ground. When snow cover reduced access by females
to the Arctic Refuge coastal plain and 1002 Area for calving, calf
survival during June was 19% lower than when they could calve on
the Arctic Refuge coastal plain and 1002 Area.
169 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'TOF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC REFUGE
COASTAL PLAIN TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE RESOURCE SUMMARIES, (D.C. Douglas et
al. eds., 2002).
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Strong link between calf survival and free movement of
females-The location of the annual calving grounds and concentrated
calving areas was variable among years in response to variable habitat
conditions and was often coincident with the 1002 Area. Empirical
relationships between calf survival, forage available to females in the
annual calving grounds, and predation risk derived from 17 years of
ecological data predict that June calf survival for the PCH will
decline if the calving grounds are displaced, and will increase with
displacement distance... 7 °
The reports' conclusions not only support the contention that
drilling for oil would be mortally detrimental to the PCH, but also
reaffirm the Final LEIS drafted by the Department of the Interior in
1987 that predicted a detrimental effect upon the herd if drilling were
allowed in the coastal plain and 1002 Area.)7' Because the PCH are
170 Id. at 34.
171 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, ALASKA, COASTAL PLAIN RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - -
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
FINAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, (N.K. Clough et al. eds.,
1987); see also Sheila Weigert, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate
Over Drilling in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, the Environment is the Only True
Loser, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 169, 175 (2001) ("Any oil exploration, drilling and
production in the coastal plain will have a detrimental effect on the Porcupine
caribou herd. Drilling for oil would greatly alter the habitat of the Porcupine
caribou, causing a loss in 'calving, insect-relief, foraging, and predator-avoidance
habitats.' Disturbance due to activities associated with oil drilling, such as the
'presence of pipelines and roads, aircraft operations, general construction, routine
field operations and the presence of humans,' is unavoidable. Because cows with
newborn calves are particularly sensitive to human activity, human disturbance
'could disproportionally affect cows with calves, which could be expected to
reduce recruitment.' Due to the unique terrain of the coastal plain, these displaced
cows would have few alternative areas available to them for calving grounds. Even
a reduction of five percent in annual calf survival 'would be sufficient to cause a
decline in the Porcupine caribou population.' Displacing the Porcupine caribou
from their traditional calving grounds in the coastal plain 'could result in
significant long-term changes in distribution, adversely affecting habitat use and
behavior patterns."').
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migratory and the most important use of the coastal plain and 1002
Area is during their calving season, the 2002 Report should be
considered valid and conclusive in advocating against drilling in
ANWR.
Muskoxen
Muskoxen are affected differently than caribou in that they are
permanent residents of the coastal area.17 1 Muskoxen numbers have
declined over time, with the current numbers dropping to approxi-
mately 300 living in the coastal plain area.' Muskoxen have also
produced offspring less over time.'74 The 1987 Final LEIS report
found that muskoxen would be affected by oil production because
they are required to reduce their activity in the winter months and
such production would require unnecessary movement, thus draining
their energy reserves for the winter months and putting the survival
of pregnant females in jeopardy.7 I The 2002 -report echoes these
same conclusions, extending the detail of such harm to foraging
capabilities and the damage that constant movement in deep snow
would cause to the survival rates of the herd; the details of the report
summary on muskoxen are provided in the footnote below. 76
172 Douglas, supra note 170, at 62.
17 Id.
174 Id.
173 Clough, supra note 172, at 124.
176 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC REFUGE
COASTAL PLAIN TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE RESOURCE SUMMARIES, (D.C. Douglas et
al. eds., 2002) at 62-63 ("Severe winters (deep snow and prolong snow seasons)
and increasing rates of predation are important factors in the dynamics of this
population. Muskoxen have expanded their range east and west of the Arctic
Refuge coastal plain and emigration has contributed to declining numbers. Most
calves are born in April and May, several weeks before green forage is available.
To survive the long months of winter and to maintain body reserves needed for
successful reproduction, muskoxen conserve energy in winter by reducing activity
and movements. In winter, muskoxen feed on dried sedges and other low quality
forage in areas of low snow. Windblown ridges adjacent to rivers are frequently
used in winter. During the short weeks of summer, when green forage is available,
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Polar Bears
The 2002 report notes a considerable shift in thinking about
polar bears from the Final LEIS filed in 1987. This may be the only
bright spot for proponents of oil drilling in their contention that
drilling would have no significant impact upon wildlife. The 1987
Final LEIS suggested that polar bears would be at risk in the coastal
plain and 1002 Area because these are their primary denning habitats
and disturbances associated with drilling would detrimentally
displace maternal polar bears, putting their survival rates at risk.'77
The 2002 report reverses this previous concern, noting that after
significant scientific research (using radio-collared polar bears) the
disturbances of human activity may not displace the polar bears from
their denning habitat as much as predicted.'78
muskoxen increase their movements and activity and feed on a variety of high
quality forage to regain body weight before the next winter. River corridors and
nearby uplands are often used by muskoxen in summer. Muskoxen in the Arctic
Refuge are vulnerable to disturbance from activities associated with petroleum
exploration and extraction because of their year-round residency, their small
population numbers and their need to conserve energy for the 9 months of winter
if they are to successfully reproduce. Disturbances that displace muskoxen from
preferred winter habitats into areas of deeper snow or that increase their activity
and movements could significantly increase their energetic costs in winter. Female
muskoxen that are required to expend greater energy to survive the winter will have
fewer reserves for pregnancy and lactation and may not reproduce successfully.
Muskoxen frequently use habitats along pr adjacent to rivers. These locations may
be sites for gravel and water extraction and winter road construction if petroleum
development is permitted in the Arctic Refuge.").
177 Sheila Weigert, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate Over
Drilling in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, the Environment is the Only True Loser, 8
ENVTL. LAW. 169, 182 (2001) ("Overall, modification of the polar bears' denning
habitats would have a negative impact on the polar bear population, as the
reproduction rate would decline.").
178 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC REFUGE
COASTAL PLAIN TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE RESOURCE SUMMARIES, (D.C. Douglas et
al. eds., 2002) at 69 ("Available data indicate polar bears are relatively resilient to
disturbances coming from outside their dens. Data showed that dens exposed to
even high levels of activity did not suffer a detectable reduction in productivity.
Perturbations resulting from capture, marking, and radio tracking maternal bears
Birds
The greatest numbers of species that may be affected by oil
exploration and production are birds. There are some 180 species of
birds that have been detected in ANWR, of which, 135 species are
known to use the 1002 Area.'79 Birds use the Refuge for breeding
and resting in their migration patterns from four continents.'
Drilling would have a major effect on feeding and migration by
disturbing and modifying these habitats. 8 ' Both the 1987 Final LEIS
and the 2002 report focus on Snow Geese because of the large
numbers that would be adversely affected by development in this
region. The Final LEIS notes that the vegetation Snow Geese forage
upon in order to build fat reserves for their migration south are small,
patchy, and spread over a majority of the coastal plain. '82 The Final
LEIS also notes that Snow Geese are extremely sensitive to human
disturbances and often leave their feeding grounds even when these
disturbances are several miles away; in turn, this loss in feeding time
and the increase in activity cumulatively and adversely impact their
accumulation of energy reserves required for migration.'83
The new 2002 report supports the Final LEIS findings in both
the areas of foraging and importance of building energy reserves.
The 2002 report especially notes that increased development would
also mean increased aircraft activity that would greatly impact bird
did not affect litter sizes or stature of cubs produced; and 10 of 12 denned polar
bears exposed to exceptional levels of activity were not measurably affected.
Hence, polar bears in dens may be less vulnerable to human disturbances than
previously thought. This finding corroborates the observations of Blix and Lenffer.
(1992) who reported that polar bears in dens are well insulated from disruptions
outside of their dens.").
179 Weigert, supra note 178, at 182.
180 Id at 83.
181 Id.
182 Id
183 Sheila Weigert, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate Over
Drilling in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, the Environment is the Only True Loser, 8
ENVTL. LAW. 169, 183 (2001).
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feeding and migratory patterns.8 4 The overall findings suggest that
development in the coastal plain and 1002 Area would have a severe
impact upon bird populations in terms of their feeding patterns and
subsequent migration mortality rates.
Other Wildlife
The main populations of wildlife reviewed above are not the only
animal wildlife that would suffer because of development in the coastal
plains and 1002 Area; populations of wolf, grizzly bear, and fish
populations would suffer as well. The 1987 Final LEIS and the new
2002 report both note the significant impacts of such development upon
these groups. "' The Final LEIS concludes that coastal wolf
populations, brown bear populations, and fish would be affected by
184 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'TOF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC REFUGE
COASTAL PLAIN TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE RESOURCE SUMMARIES, (D.C. Douglas et
al. eds., 2002) at 73 ("Staging snow geese are easily disturbed by aircraft activity.
Repeated aircraft disturbance can reduce their rate of food intake due to disruption
of feeding behavior and displacement from feeding habitats. Reduced fat
accumulation and diminished survival during migration could result from repeated
aircraft disturbance... Several studies suggest that human disturbance can displace
staging snow geese from feeding habitats and possibly diminish the size ofjuvenile
fat reserves ... [an estimated] 20-30 aircraft overflights/day would reduce fat
reserves of juvenile snow geese on the Arctic Refuge by up to 50%, assuming
geese were unable to increase feeding time to compensate for disturbance. Aircraft
disturbance would likely have a greater affect on juvenile snow geese because they
spend a higher proportion of the day feeding, accumulate fat reserves at a slower
rate, and depart with smaller reserves than adults. Displacement of geese from
feeding areas on the Arctic Refuge is of special concern because feeding habitats
are limited and a large proportion of the frequently used region is within the 1002
Area ... We cannot assume that snow geese would be able to locate adequate
feeding habitat in other regions if they were displaced from the Arctic Refuge
coastal plain.").
185 id. at 51-53; see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, ALASKA, COASTAL PLAIN
RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - - REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND FINAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
(N.K. Clough et al. eds., 1987) at 126-129.
increased human activity and oil development.'86 The 2002 report
supports the Final LEIS findings but notes that it is an indirect impact
and also that outside factors impacted these predator populations
perhaps more directly than the distributions of their prey populations.8 7
Part VI: National Interests in ANWR
Amount of Recoverable Oil
Whether to drill and create production facilities for oil in
ANWR's coastal plain or the 1002 Area may turn on the benefits to
be derived from the amount of oil actually available from these areas.
In the 1987 Final LEIS, there was a reported 19% chance of finding
oil in the coastal plain with an estimated average of 3.2 billion barrels
of oil recoverable.' 8 Based on the 1987 estimate, these 3.2 billion
186 Clough, supra note 185, at 127, 129 (Wolf populations would decline
because of "direct mortality and reduced production or survival of young caused
by reduced prey availability." Brown bears in the Coastal Plain would decline in
population because of "additive effects of direct mortality, decreased prey
availability, harassment, and disturbance of denning areas." Fish populations
would also decrease because of "lost or reduced habitat values, inhibited
movements, and direct mortality."); see also Weigert, supra note 184, at 184.
187 Douglas, supra note 185, at 51-53 ("Grizzly bear distributions during the
caribou calving period in early June appeared to be influenced by a combination
of factors including seasonal habitat selection patterns, annual variations in
snowmelt, and annual distribution patterns of calving caribou. Within-year (1983-
1993) spatial distribution patterns of radio-collared grizzly bears did not differ
among time periods, whereas concurrent distributions of calving caribou did differ.
This suggests that annual grizzly bear distributions were influenced less by the
distribution of calving caribou than by other factors (e.g., annual snowmelt
patterns)... During the caribou calving period, radio-collared wolves were located
primarily in the mountains and foothills where their activity was associated with
den sites. All known wolf den sites on the North Slope of the Arctic Refuge have
been located in the mountains and foothills. Thus, the availability of suitable den
sites appears to be the primary factor influencing wolf distributions during the
calving period.").
88 Anthony R. Chase, Imminent Threat to America's Last Great Wilderness,
70 DENY. U. L. REv. 43,49 (1992).
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barrels of oil would meet current United States demand for a
maximum of 195 days. 189
In April, 1991, the Bureau of Land Management reported an
increased probability of finding oil in the coastal plain to a 46%
chance of finding an estimated 3.23 to 3.57 billion barrels of oil and
a 5% chance of finding at least 8.8 billion barrels of oil.'90 However,
this 1991 report was highly criticized because it did not "list
references, identify studies, or explain the bases for the Department's
conclusions."'' The 1991 report was highly controversial in terms
of credibility and therefore its findings should be highly scrutinized.
Finally, in 1998, the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
completed a study of the coastal plain and found that between 4.3 and
11.8 billion barrels of oil could be recovered from the 1002 Area. 192
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service, using these estimates
199 Danford D. Grant, Protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Without
Section 1003: Will the Discretionary Requirements ofEnvironmental andResource
Management Statutes Fill the Gap?, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 47, 51
(1997).
190 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OVERVIEW OF
THE 1991 ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE RECOVERABLE PETROLEUM
RESOURCE UPDATE (April 8, 1991) at 1.
191 Grant, supra note 190, at 52; see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Lujan,
768 F. Supp. 870, 884 (D.D.C. 1991) (In Lujan, the Department of the Interior was
found to have failed to circulate for public comment the Overview and therefore
violated NEPA. The Department was.ordered to circulate the Overview as a
supplemental EIS because the changes it contained were significant. Here, the
NRDC was particularly concerned that the Overview did not list references,
identify sources, or explain the basis for the Department's conclusions).
192 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, 1002 AREA, PETROLEUM ASSESSMENT, 1998, USGS
Fact Sheet FS-040-98 (May 1998) at i; see also Sheila Weigert, Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate Over Drilling in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, the
Environment is the Only True Loser, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 169, 171 (2001) ("this USGS
estimate means that there is a 95% probability that more than 4.3 billion barrels of
oil are technically recoverable, and that there is a 5% probability that more than
11.8 billion barrels of oil are technically recoverable. Notably, these 'technically
recoverable oil' estimates and probability ranges do not consider the cost of
discovery, development and production of oil in the coastal plain.").
has suggested that at $24 per barrel there is a "50% chance of finding
a 9 month's supply of oil in the 1002 Area.' 93
Regardless of which of these studies one relies upon, it is a
poor choice to advocate drilling for oil in this pristine natural
wilderness area and impacting the vast array of natural habitats,
despite the short-term economic impacts, for a mere benefit of a nine
month supply of oil.
United States Dependency on Foreign Oil
One of the main arguments that proponents ofANWR drilling
note is that the United States must become more self-sufficient in the
area of oil production to ensure our progress and remain independent
from foreign oil producers. 19 4 The arguments for increasing domestic
supply of oil and decreasing foreign imports is a hazy area of political
and economic speculation. United States' dependency upon oil is not
because it is foreign, but because it is a commodity that will open the
United States to vulnerability of disruptions in a foreign market
regardless of whether there is an increase its domestic production. 95
In fact, "studies suggest 'reducing the nation's reliance on foreign oil
by increasing domestic production would probably do little to
decrease [disruptions]...because it would not substantially reduce their
likelihood or cost."" 96 Increasing domestic production might not
solve the United States dependency problem, in fact, the United
States might actually become more dependent if it depleted its
domestic resources faster by importing less.1
97
193 Weigert, supra note 193, at 171.
194 Id at 172; see also Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's
Greatest Untapped Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215, 234 (2001) (Supporters of
allowing drilling in ANWR "cite America's dependence on unstable supplies of
foreign oil as a primary reason for promoting such a policy.").
19S Sherman, supra note 195, at 235.
196 Id
197 Id.
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ANWR and Effect on United States Oil Prices
Regardless of whether the United States decides to drill for oil
in ANWR, the government will be unable to avoid the effect of oil
supply fluctuations that stem from agreements and associations
between the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 9 ' In addition, increasing
domestic production and the therefore bolstering our domestic
security and the related costs now associated with military and
national security operations in the Middle-East are unknown.'99 In
the end, drilling for oil in ANWR "[would] not resolve the United
States' overwhelming energy needs... 'would do nothing to address
United States' long-term need for greater energy efficiency, would
not affect the price of gasoline at the pump, and would not
significantly reduce United States dependence upon foreign oil. " 2 0
Part VII: New Developments and Contradictions
Securing America's Future Energy Act of 2001
On August 1, 2001, the House of Representatives passed an
extensive bill that looked to energy conservation, automobile fuel
efficiency, nuclear power resources, hydroelectric energy, current
fuels, renewable energy, alternative conservation programs, increased
oil exploration, and incentive programs to solve the United States
198 Id. at 234 (OPEC "produce[s] 40 percent of the world's oil, hold[s] 77
percent of proved oil reserves, and control[s] most of the unused capacity capable
of producing more oil.").
199 Id. at 236.
200 Sheila Weigert, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate Over
Drilling in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, the Environment is the Only True Loser, 8
ENVTL. LAW. 169, 173 (2001).
current energy demands and future energy needs.2"' Included within
this bill was Title V, the Arctic Coastal Plain Domestic Security Act
of 2001, introduced to the House on July 10, 2001, and subsequently
passed as part of the Securing America's Future Energy Act of 2001
on August 1, 2001.120
Arctic Coastal Plain Domestic Security Act of 2001
This bill, passed by the House but subsequently killed in the
Senate, looked to explore for oil and natural gas in ANWR's coastal
plain or "1002 Area" in a way that:
Would result in an environmentally sound program for
the exploration; development, and production of the oil and gas
resources of the Coastal Plain; and (2) ...ensure the oil and gas
exploration, development, and production activities on the
Coastal Plain [would] result in no significant adverse effect on
fish and wildlife, their habitat, subsistence resources, and the
environment."0 3
The goal of this bill could be considered impossible. The bill
looks to achieve such noble goals through the use of, "best
commercially available technology for oil and gas exploration,
development and production,"20 4 and through requiring an additional
EIS before conducting the first lease sales.2 5 The bill also gives the
Secretary of the Interior special powers to designate up to 45,000
acres of the Coastal Plain as a "Special Area" if it is "of such unique
character and interest so as to require special management and
regulatory protection. ' 26  This is interesting because the entire
201 Securing America's Future Energy Act of 2001, H.R. 4, 107th Cong. §§
1-9 (2001).
202 Arctic Coastal Plain Domestic Energy Security Act of 2001, H.R. 39,
107th Cong. Title V (2001).
203 Id. at § 502(a)(l)-(2).
204 Id. at § 502(a).
205 Id. at § 502(c)(3).
206 Id. at 502(d)(1).
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Coastal Plain and arguably all of ANWR could be considered a
Special Area under the bill's definition." 7 In a clear contradiction,
the bill identifies a goal of"avoiding any significant adverse impact"
while at the same time having as its construction goals, "design[ing]
safety and construction standards...(A) that minimize, to the
maximum extent possible, adverse effects upon the passage of
migratory species as caribou; and (B) minimize adverse effects upon
the flow of surface water." ' Throughout the bill, its words and its
intent are patently irreconcilable.
Environmentally Sensitive Drilling
The ultimate question remains; is it possible to drill for oil in
some kind of environmentally sensitive manner? Proponents of
drilling argue that there are new technologies that help reduce the
"footprint" of exploration and development.20 9 These technologies:
directional drilling, the re-injection of drilling wastes back into the
ground, the use of three-dimensional seismic surveys to find oil, and
the use of temporary ice roads for use in winter exploration, while
cutting edge and, to a certain extent, "less intrusive" than traditional
means, are still extremely detrimental to the environment.210 In the
end, "oil development in a wilderness, no matter how sensitive,
changes the very nature of it. It means it's no longer wilderness." ''
207 Arctic Coastal Plain Domestic Energy Security Act of 2001, H.R. 39,
107th Cong. Title V, § 502(d)(i)-(2) (2001) (The special areas are to be managed
"so as to protect and preserve the area's unique and diverse character including its
fish, wildlife, and subsistence resource values.").
208 Id at §507(d)(4)(A)-(B).
209 Sheila Weigert, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate Over
Drilling in the Refuge's Coastal Plain, the Environment is the Only True Loser, 8
ENVTL. LAW. 169,186 (2001).
210 Id. at 185.
211 Thomas L. Friedman, Drilling in the Cathedral, N.Y. TIMES, March 2,
2001, at A23 (Richard Fineberg, an Alaskan environmental consultant quoted).
Conclusion
The final result of any decision to drill in ANWR is cumu-
lative and complete disaster. Not only will the pristine habitats and
ecosystems be irreparably damaged, thus impacting all wildlife that
depends on these ecosystems for existence, but the economy at all
levels will obtain no substantial benefit from such devastation. At the
state level, the individual Native organizations that have been key
players in the Prudhoe Bay experience, will fail to benefit in any
substantial way from ANWR drilling. The state of Alaska, while
greatly dependent upon oil ,for revenue, only continues a trend of
dependence upon this commodity as the main staple in its economy;
subject to disaster in a fluctuating market. At the national level there
is no benefit from depleting what little reserves do exist in ANWR.
The market will not bear any impact from an increased domestic oil
production and the price of gasoline to consumers will not
substantially change.
What may be the more reasonable, viable, and practical option
would be to designate the remaining part of ANWR at issue, the
coastal plain (1002 Area), as a wilderness area that would increase
protection of the area as pristine wilderness. Changing the status from
a wildlife refuge to a national wilderness area protects the area from
commercial enterprise and permanent roads as well as maintenance
roads, aircraft landing areas, and exploration for oil, gas, or
minerals.2t 2
Changing the status to a wilderness area also could be
considered a technology forcing decision for the United States
because it would look away from maintaining the dependence for
energy on such non-renewable resources. Options for alternatives
like a general decrease in fuel consumption, and increasing energy
212 Anthony R. Chase, Imminent Threat to America's Last Great Wilderness,
70 DENy. U. L. REv. 43, 66 (1992).
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efficiency are two basic alternatives that could be considered. 13 A
simple technology forcing bill that would require automobile
producers to increase light truck fuel efficiency a mile or two per
gallon would save 20 billion barrels of oil per year, "six times the
most likely amount of economically recoverable oil in the Refuge.1212
The current legislation is strongly opposed in the Senate by
Democratic leaders who disagree with drilling in ANWR,21 5 and who
have voted down the bill. However, despite the recent small victory,
ANWR's coastal plain will continue in this stagnant debate until its
status is either changed and the United States looks to alternative
methods to meet its energy consumption needs, or there becomes no
other alternative but to drill in the last great pristine wilderness for a
few months' supply of oil.
213 Eleanor A. Hunt, Drilling for Oil Underneath the Arctic's Coastal Plain:
Proposal for Another Prudhoe Bay Environmental Disaster, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 189,
212(2001).
214 Id. at 213.
215 Id. at 212-213.
